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Abstract. Translation, according to Charles S. Peirce, is semiotic mediation. In sign 
processes in general, the sign mediates between the object, which it represents, and its 
interpretant, the idea it evokes, the interpretation it creates, or the action it causes. To 
what extent does the way a translator mediates correspond to what a sign does in 
semiosis? The paper inquires into the parallels between the agency of the sign in 
semiosis and the agency of the interpreter (and translator) in translation. It argues that 
some of the limits and limitations of translatability are also the limits of the sign in 
semiosis. Since genuine icons and genuine indices do not convey meaning they are 
strictly speaking also untranslatable. Nevertheless, icons and indices also serve as 
mediators in learning how to translate. 
 
 
1. Mediation:  
The agency of the sign and of its interpretant 
This paper presents complementary Peircean perspectives to Peeter Torop’s 
Total Translation and to his “Semiotics of Mediation” (Torop 2000, 2012) as 
well as to the Peircean theory of translation elaborated by Dinda Gorlée (1994, 
2004). In contrast to the studies by these authors, who are concerned with 
semiotic aspects of translation proper, the present paper focuses mainly on 
translation as a metaphor to elucidate the process of semiotic mediation in 
general. Peirce often used the concept of mediation simply as a synonym of the 
concepts of sign and representation (cf. Parmentier 1985, Nöth 2011a). Trans-
lators are evidently also agents who mediate between speakers and hearers of 
different languages, but what do they have in common with the agency of signs 
in sign processes in general? 
                                                          
1  Postal address: Universität Kassel, FB 02, IAA, D-34109 Kassel, Germany.  
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It is well known that the interpretant of the sign must not be confounded 
with the interpreter in the sense of the addressee who interprets a message. 
Interpretant is Peirce’s term for the third of the three constituents of a sign; it 
refers to the ideas which a sign conveys to its interpreters, the mental, 
emotional or behavioural effect of the sign on its addressees. In Peirce’s words, 
it is “the proper significate outcome of a sign” (CP 5.473, 1907). The two other 
agents in semiosis are the sign in the narrower sense, occasionally also called 
the representamen, and the object represented by the sign, that is, the dynamical 
and the immediate object. The dynamical or real object is the object “as 
unlimited and final study would show it to be” (CP 8.183, EP 2: 495, 1909; CP 
4.536, 1906); it can therefore only be incompletely represented by its sign. The 
immediate object is a mental representation of the dynamical object, an idea, 
knowledge, or mere notion which we have of the real object of the sign; in this 
sense, it is “the Object as the Sign represents it” (CP 8.343, 1910) or “the 
Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea” (EP 2: 495, 1909).  
In the process of semiosis, the sign is a first, the object a second, and the 
interpretant a third. This triadic order corresponds to the temporal order in 
which the three play their part in the process of semiosis (e.g., CP 7.591, 1866). 
The sign comes first insofar as it is the first which we perceive before 
interpretation begins. Its object is the second insofar as it antecedes the sign as 
the knowledge which we must have to interpret it, whereas the interpretant is 
the third because it interprets the sign and its object.  
Consider the example of a red traffic light. The sign pertains to the present, 
the moment in which a driver perceives it. The object antecedes it since it is the 
driver’s knowledge of the traffic regulation and the awareness that the red light 
means ‘stop’. The interpretant follows the driver’s perception of the light since 
it is the habit of road users to stop when the traffic light has turned red. Peirce’s 
semiotics is not a psychological theory of actual sign processing. The sign is not 
merely that which is first perceived before it is interpreted. Instead, it is a 
“power”, a semiotic potency, which “is of the nature of a mental habit” and 
which “consists in the fact that something would be” (MS 675, ca. 1911, quoted 
from Balat 1990: 48, fn. 8).  
Semiotic mediation occurs whenever “a Third […] brings a First into 
relation to a Second” (CP 8.332, 1904), but since both the interpretant and, in 
the sense of a triadic relation, the sign, too, are phenomena of thirdness, both 
the sign and the interpretant mediate in semiosis, although in different senses. 
The sign mediates because it does not only represent its object but also fulfills 
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the task of bringing “the interpretant into a relation to the object, corres-
ponding to its own relation to the object” (ibid.). Peirce uses the trivalent verb 
to bring to characterize the agency of the sign’s triadic mediation. The logic of 
the verb to bring, just like that of the verb to give, requires the collaboration of 
three participants (CP 1.363, 1890); it presupposes a bringer (“a triple relative 
term”, ibid.), something that is brought, and a receiver, to whom the object is 
transferred. According to this semiotic scenario, the sign is the bringer or 
deliverer of something; the object, which is some information about a reality 
that precedes the sign, is that which the sign is bringing, and the interpretant is 
the receiver of this delivery. To establish a correspondence between two things 
is to establish a triadic relation. The interpretant cannot be conceived of 
without the two other semiotic agents to which it is related. 
In a different sense, not only the sign but also the interpretant is a mediating 
agency in semiosis. As a third, the interpretant mediates like all thirds mediate 
between a first and a second. More specifically, the interpretant of a sign is “a 
mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation of the 
same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents” (CP 1.553, EP 
1: 5, 1867, italics in original). In other words: the interpretant mediates by 
interpreting the sign as a representation of its object.  
Peirce makes explicit reference to the affinity of the semiotic agency of the 
interpretant with the work of a translator when he uses the verb to translate to 
describe how the interpretant interprets its sign in the process of semiosis and 
how thought interprets thought in the process of reasoning:  
 
Thought […] is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a sign 
unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed. 
Thought requires achievement for its own development, and without this develop-
ment it is nothing. Thought must live and grow in incessant new and higher trans-
lations, or it proves itself not to be genuine thought. (CP 5.594, 1903)  
 
Since signs are fallible, the growth of signs through the mediation of their 
interpretants is not a growth that manifests itself in each and every individual 
translation. Instead, it manifests itself “in the long run”, through the self-
correcting mechanisms inherent in the evolution of human thought, which 
evolves in a “community of understanding”, sharing and presupposing a 
common “fund of collateral experience”, as Colapietro (2003: 197) puts it. 
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2. The interpretant as an interpreter, semiosis  
as translation, and the limits of translatability and 
interpretability 
In English semiotic terminology, the term interpreter is actually ambiguous. An 
interpreter is either ‘an addressee who interprets a message’, or ‘a person who 
translates spoken language’. Peirce has studied the semiotic roles of inter-
preters in both senses. In his terminology, the utterer and interpreter are the two 
persons engaged in a dialogue (Colapietro 1993: 10). The interpreter in this 
sense of an interpreting addressee is also of interest to translation studies (cf. 
Gorlée 2004: 248) but interpretation in this sense is not in the focus of this 
paper.2 In order to avoid ambiguities, the term interpreter-translator will oc-
casionally be used in the following to refer to the interpreter in the latter sense. 
Above, we observed that the interpreter should not be confounded with the 
interpretant of the sign, but we also concluded that the interpretant is a 
semiotic mediator. If the interpretant is a mediator, its role in semiosis should 
be in some respect similar to that of an interpreter-translator, whose role is 
evidently also to mediate, namely between speakers of different languages. 
When an English interpreter translates a speech delivered by a French speaker 
into English, she mediates between the French speaker and the English 
audience insofar as her audience depends on her communicating the same 
ideas to them as those conveyed by the French speaker (cf. CP 1.553, EP 1: 5, 
1867). This characteristic of mediation makes the role of an interpreter-
translator similar to that of the interpretant in semiosis in general. Just as the 
interpreter-translator mediates between speakers of two languages, the 
interpretant mediates between the object and the sign by interpreting the 
message conveyed by the former to the latter (cf. Nöth 2011a). In which sense 
is the interpretant, which is a sign itself, a mediating agent in semiosis in general 
(cf. Nöth 2009, 2011a)? Is Peirce’s use of this term merely metaphorical?  
When Peirce first introduced the term interpretant, he explained it with the 
example of someone learning French who uses a dictionary to look up the 
                                                          
2  Notice that in traditional models of communication (cf. Santaella, Nöth 2004) the role 
of the interpreter in the sense of the addressee is usually not represented as the one of a 
mediator but as the one of a more or less passive recipient. The idea of passivity is also 
expressed in the patient suffix -ee of the term addressee. Peirce’s term interpreter, with its 
agentive suffix -er in parallel with the one of its terminological counterpart utterer suggests 
much more the idea of an agent in semiosis than the term addressee. 
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meaning of homme and finds that it means man. In this context, the semantic 
correspondence of homme with man, ascertained by the dictionary, illustrates 
the role of the interpretant as “a mediating representation […] because it fulfils 
the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which 
he himself says” (CP 1.553, W 2: 53–4, 1867). In this example the dictionary 
fulfills the same task as an interpreter-translator. Both do not simply mediate by 
substituting unknown words of a source language for known words of a target 
language; they mediate by establishing relations between signs and the objects 
these signs represent in two languages.  
Interpretants and interpreter-translators are subject to similar preconditions 
of their ability to translate signs. The semiotically most fundamental prerequisite 
for translatability is the knowledge of or familiarity with the object of the sign. A 
sign cannot convey the idea of an unknown object and cannot make an 
interpreter acquainted with such an object. It can only represent an object with 
which the interpreter is already familiar. Peirce calls this prerequisite of felicitous 
semiosis “collateral observation” and defines it as follows: “By collateral 
observation, I mean previous acquaintance with what the sign denotes. […] 
Collateral observation […] is no part of the Interpretant. But to put together the 
different subjects as the sign represents them as related –  that is the main [i.e., 
force] of the Interpretant-forming” (CP 8.179; EP 2: 494, 1909).  
Hence, the familiarity with the object of the sign – which we need in order 
to understand the sign – cannot be created by an interpretant nor by a 
translator-interpreter. Just as the meaning of the colour word vermilion cannot 
really be taught to anyone who has never seen a sample of this particular 
colour, translators cannot convey the meaning of the words of a source lan-
guage representing cultural idiosyncrasies unknown to an audience only 
acquainted with their own culture. For example, the meaning of the English 
word Beefeater remains largely concealed when it is translated by means of the 
paraphrase ‘traditional guard at the Tower of London’. This paraphrase does 
not tell us what the fancy uniforms of these guards look like, and it will not 
enable us to identify a Beefeater among a dozen of men in diverse uniforms. The 
object represented by a verbal symbol must be known before a hearer can 
understand it. This is why familiarity is a prerequisite of the translatability and 
interpretability of signs. Collateral experience of the object presupposes prior 
lived experience of the object of the sign, which no translation can convey on 
its own. For instance, to give another example, the full meaning of the word 
passion fruit is untranslatable to someone who has never tasted this fruit.  
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According to the quote above, translators and interpretants have the task of 
“putting together the different subjects as the sign represents them as related”, 
instead of making the objects of signs familiar. The interpretant and equally the 
interpreter-translator have the task to interpret how the signs of objects, whose 
familiarity must be presupposed, are related among themselves; how they are 
combined and how new meanings are created by combining them.  
A trivial prerequisite of translatability and interpretability is the knowledge of 
the signs which are to be translated or interpreted and which Peirce refers to as 
the prerequisite of “acquaintance with the system of signs”. He distinguishes it 
from the prerequisite of acquaintance with the object of the sign as follows: “I do 
not mean by ‘collateral observation’ acquaintance with the system of signs. What 
is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for 
getting any idea signified by the sign” (CP 8.179; EP 2: 494, 1909).  
The presupposed familiarity with the object of the sign has consequences 
concerning the possibilities of their translatability. Strictly speaking, only symbols 
are fully translatable. In fact, to learn a second language means to acquire the 
habit of associating signs with objects. Symbols are signs based on habits, and 
habits can be changed, whereas similarities between signs and their objects, as in 
the case of the icon, or existential relations, as in the case of the index, cannot be 
changed. Genuine indices and pure icons, therefore, are strictly speaking 
untranslatable. An index, such as a gesture of pointing or the indication of a 
temperature by a thermometer, needs no translation, nor do iconic signs such as 
pictures have to be translated. Translations of icons and indices are only 
necessary and possible to the degree that these signs are combined with 
conventional signs, such as numbers, words, or cultural symbols. When 
translators translate verbal indices, such as deictic words, or verbal icons, such as 
onomatopoeic words, they only translate their symbolic components.  
It is true that translators can replace a verbal icon in the source language 
with a similar verbal image in the target language and a verbal index with a 
different index indicating the same object, but, depending on the degree to 
which they do so, they run the risk of diminishing translational equivalence. 
This does not necessarily mean a loss of meaning since translations can also be 
creative and lead to what Peirce calls a “growth of symbols”.  
However, as Peirce also points out, symbols, and with them, translations, can 
only grow through symbols, and not through icons and indices. Although 
symbols “come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from 
icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and symbols”, it is also 
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true that “if a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it 
is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow” (CP 2.302, c. 1895).  
 
 
3. Icons and indices as mediators in translation and 
language learning 
How mediation and translation contribute to the growth of symbols has been 
described by Peirce, who uses examples from vocabulary acquisition in 
language learning. Here, the role of the interpreter-translator evidently 
corresponds to the role of the teacher. Of course, in language teaching, the 
teacher’s mediation is not restricted to translation proper, i. e., to interlingual 
translation, as in the old-fashioned translation method of second language 
teaching. In the so-called direct method of foreign language teaching, teachers 
mediate through intralingual and intersemiotic translation. In intralingual 
translation, an unknown word of the source language is mediated through its 
synonym or paraphrase, which substitute simpler and known words of that 
same language for it; a more basic vocabulary serves to explain the meaning of 
new vocabulary. In intersemiotic translation, the teacher teaches new words by 
using nonverbal signs, such as pictures, films, scenic enactments, or gestures.  
Peirce did not propose a full-fledged theory of translation, let alone a theory 
of second language learning. The purpose of his reflections on these topics was 
rather to illustrate the role of the sign and its interpretant in semiosis in general 
(cf. Nöth 2010b). Nevertheless, in the course of these reflections, he conveys 
most interesting insights into the nature of translation and language learning. 
Let us consider in detail how Peirce uses the scenario of learning and teaching 
to illustrate the affinity of the roles of a language teacher who translates a word 
with the role of the interpretant in semiosis. The example quoted above of how 
the meaning of homme can be learned from its translation was only a fragment 
of the following much more comprehensive reflection on how translations 
mediate in vocabulary acquisition: 
 
Suppose we look up the word homme in a French dictionary; we shall find opposite 
to it the word man, which, so placed, represents homme as representing the same 
two-legged creature which man itself represents. By a further accumulation of 
instances, it would be found that every comparison requires, besides the related 
thing, the ground, and the correlate, also a mediating representation which represents 
the relate to be a representation of the same correlate which this mediating repre-
286 Winfried Nöth 
 
sentation itself represents. Such a mediating representation may be termed an inter-
pretant. (CP 1.553 & W 2: 53–4, 1867)  
 
According to this scenario, the word homme is at first only a potential but not 
yet an actual sign to the student of French. It has no effect on the student’s 
mind and cannot create an interpretant as long as the student does not yet have 
the habit of associating the word with the idea of its object, that is, its 
immediate object. The dictionary, like an interpreter, informing that homme 
means the same as man, tells the student that both words represent the same 
immediate object, the idea abbreviated as the one of a ‘two-legged creature’. 
With this immediate object, the student is familiar through the English word 
man and other signs representing it; only the habit of associating the French 
word with this object has not yet been acquired. Through the mediation of the 
dictionary, the unknown word can now be interpreted. The dictionary does not 
directly convey information about the meaning of the word homme, which is its 
immediate object (CP 2.292, 1903), but only indirectly or mediately through 
another sign, the English word, which the dictionary lists as semantically 
equivalent. This is why the dictionary provides “a mediating representation”.  
The above language learning scenario elucidates the agency of an inter-
pretant in semiosis in general. The interpretant is a mediating representation. 
The interpretant represents the sign, which it interprets, as a representation of 
the same object which the sign also represents. Applied to the symbol man in 
English, we find that the interpretant, is the idea created by this word in a 
potential interpreter’s mind. This idea or thought represents the same object 
which is also represented by the word man itself, namely the ‘two-legged 
creature’ with which we all are more or less familiar. 
Above, we discussed Peirce’s insight that a symbol cannot be made 
intelligible to an interpreter who has no collateral knowledge of the object 
represented by that symbol. When the interpreter knows nothing about the 
object, the missing acquaintance with it cannot be compensated for by means 
of translating the symbol into another symbol. The acquaintance with an 
unknown object can only be made through experience with the object itself or 
through new information about it. Symbols cannot convey any new infor-
mation about their objects because they are only connected with their objects 
through the habit which associates the one with the other (Nöth 2010a). 
Habits lack creativity; this is why they cannot convey new insights.  
Acquaintance with an unknown object can only be conveyed through an 
icon in conjunction with an index. Indices cannot give any information about 
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an unknown object by themselves, but they can draw the interpreter’s attention 
to the object by saying (so to speak): “There it is!”3 This is the first step in 
becoming acquainted with an unknown object. Ostensive definitions are based 
on this insight. The second language learner learns what the word carrot means 
when the teacher who adopts the direct method points to a real carrot; but the 
meaning of a carrot is not inherent in the pointing gesture itself. 
The only sign from which new information about an unknown object can 
be obtained is an icon in conjunction with an index.4 Knowledge of what a 
passion fruit is cannot be fully gained until we see and taste the real fruit, but an 
icon depicting this fruit can convey some knowledge about its colour and 
shape, and a synthetic simulation of its taste can even inform iconically about 
its taste. However, in order to convey the information that these signs are icons 
of a passion fruit, they must be accompanied by an index, such as a legend, that 
says: “This is a passion fruit.” Without this index, these icons would represent 
the mere possibilities of some unknown fruit. A verbal icon, such as a detailed 
description of an unknown house, can serve to create a mental image of it and 
make us somewhat familiar with the object of this verbal description, but an 
index must tell us where this house (CP 2.287, ca. 1893). 
The role of icons and indices in mediating knowledge about unknown 
objects is a topic which Peirce addresses in another example of language 
learning, this time in the context of first language acquisition.  
 
A man walking with a child points his arm up into the air and says, “There is a 
balloon.” The pointing arm is an essential part of the symbol without which the 
latter would convey no information. But if the child asks, “What is a balloon,” and 
the man replies, “It is something like a great big soap bubble,” he makes the image a 
part of the symbol. Thus, while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its 
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a 
character. (CP 2.293, 1903) 
 
                                                          
3  “The index asserts nothing; it only says “There!” It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, 
and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops” (CP 3.361, 1885). 
4  More precisely, icons can convey information about their object only in conjunction 
with indices. Peirce elaborates on them as follows: “Icons may be of the greatest service in 
obtaining information – in geometry, for example – but still, it is true that an Icon cannot, 
of itself, convey information” (CP 2.314, 1903), and: “A pure icon can convey no positive 
or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing in nature. But 
it is of the utmost value for enabling its interpreter to study what would be the character of 
such an object in case any such did exist” (CP 4.447, 1903). 
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In this little first language learning scenario, the man’s pointing gesture is the 
index that indentifies the object of the verbal sign balloon. Despite the teacher’s 
gesture and the child’s apparent awareness of the balloon in the sky, the child’s 
question, “What is a balloon?”, testifies to his or her insufficient familiarity with 
the object of the sign. The icon of this object mentally evoked by the teacher by 
means of the verbal image of “something like a great soap bubble” contributes 
to creating the more fully developed mental image which the learner needs to 
associate this word with its object in the future.  
Elsewhere, Peirce reflects once more on the nature of mediation in second 
language vocabulary acquisition. The language learning scenario seems very 
similar, but at closer inspection, we find that the relation between a verbal 
symbol and its object in ordinary language usage differs from the one between 
the word and its object in vocabulary teaching: 
 
If a person points to it and says, See there! That is what we call the “Sun,” the Sun 
is not the Object of that sign. It is the Sign of the sun, the word “sun” that his 
declaration is about; and that word we must become acquainted with by collateral 
experience. Suppose a teacher of French says to an English-speaking pupil, who 
asks “comment appelle-t-on ça?” pointing to the Sun, . . . “C’est le soleil,” he 
begins to furnish that collateral experience by speaking in French of the Sun itself. 
Suppose, on the other hand, he says “Notre mot est ‘soleil’” then instead of 
expressing himself in language and describing the word he offers a pure Icon of it. 
Now the Object of an Icon is entirely indefinite, equivalent to “something.” He 
virtually says “our word is like this:” and makes the sound. He informs the pupil 
that the word, (meaning, of course, a certain habit) has an effect which he pictures 
acoustically. But a pure picture without a legend only says “something is like 
this:”. (CP 8.183; EP 2: 495, 1909) 
 
Three scenarios of vocabulary teaching are described in the above passage. The 
first shows a teacher who teaches the word sun to students who do not yet 
know what it means. Whether the learner is a child learning English as a first 
language or a student of English as a second language remains unspecified. The 
learner apparently needs to be made familiar with the English word that 
represents the sun, but the teacher knows that the learner is acquainted with 
the celestial body, the sun as such. The student’s familiarity presupposed, the 
teacher first uses a nonverbal pointing gesture, an indexical sign reinforced 
though verbal indices (See there! That is…), whose object is the sun in the sky.  
When the topic of the didactic dialogue turns to the word for the sun in 
English and the teacher says “That is what we call the ‘Sun’”, the object of this 
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complex sign is no longer the sun itself but the verbal sign which represents it, 
that is, the English word representing the object previously denoted by the 
pointing gesture. This means that the sun previously referred to as the object of 
a sign is now considered the sign of a sign, that is, a metasign. In the utterance 
“That is what we call the ‘Sun’”, the word sun refers to the word sun as a word of 
the vocabulary of English; the same word is no longer used in the sense in 
which it appears in everyday usage, that is, in object language, but in the sense 
of a sign of a sign. The teacher’s words exemplify language about language, that 
is, metalanguage.  
The learner still unfamiliar with the English word sun knows the object of 
this unknown sign through other signs, the word soleil in the case of second 
language learning, or prior experience of having seen the sun in everyday life, as 
in the case of the child in first language learning. What is missing is the word 
that translates this otherwise well known sign into English. The teacher who 
teaches the English word representing an object with which the learner is 
familiar from other signs thus teaches the word sun as a metasign. 
According to the Peircean semiotic framework, the three phonemes /sʌn/ 
are uttered by the teacher as a sinsign (or token), that is, as a particular sign 
uttered at a particular moment. As such, it also embodies a qualisign, the quality 
of how it sounds (cf. CP 2.255, 1903). What this sinsign serves to denote is a 
legisign (or type). The term legisign characterizes the word sun as a word of the 
sign system of the English language, irrespective of whether it is used in a 
particular situation or not. The particular metalingual use of the teacher’s 
utterance of the sinsign sun is thus the use of a sinsign to denote a legisign. The 
teacher’s metalingual utterance serves the purpose of making the learner 
acquainted with a new word. The intended interpretant is the learner’s future 
habit of pronouncing this word correctly. The collateral experience necessary 
to pronounce the word appropriately is the experience of hearing this and other 
pronunciations of it, not the knowledge and experience of the celestial body.  
Although the object of the sinsign /sʌn/ uttered by the teacher is not the 
sun itself but the word sun as a legisign, the reference to the real sun is not lost 
with this utterance since the word sun as a legisign is in turn a sign whose object 
is the real sun. In sum, reference to the sun as a celestial body is embedded as a 
second object in the object of the sinsign sun, whose first object is the legisign, 
the word of the English language. 
The next two didactic situations exemplified in the above scenario describe 
a lesson in which a teacher teaches the French word soleil to a student of 
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French, whose mother tongue is apparently English. This time, it is the student 
who produces two indexical signs denoting the sun, a gesture pointing to the 
sun and the utterance of the demonstrative pronoun “ça”. In the first of the two 
following didactic subscenarios, in which the teacher replies “C’est le soleil”, she 
uses the word soleil as the word of an object language since the referent of the 
verbal index ce (C’[est]) is indeed the sun itself. In the second scenario, in 
which the teacher says “Notre mot est ‘soleil’”, we are faced with a teaching 
situation as above: the teacher produces a sinsign of a legisign.  
Peirce now specifies in addition that the sinsign uttered by the teacher in 
this scenario is iconically related to the legisign it denotes. In sum, when 
language teachers introduce a new word whose referent the students are 
familiar with, their utterance of this word is a sinsign embodying a qualisign 
which serves as an icon of a legisign.  
The object of the iconic sinsign uttered by the teacher is “entirely 
indefinite” as long as it represents a mere acoustic quality. Any other word 
uttered in any other language would be equally indefinite as long as it remains 
only a mere sound. The student must learn to associate this iconic sinsign with 
the symbolic legisign as which the word functions in French. Peirce calls this 
necessary mental association of the sound uttered by the teacher with the word 
of the French language a “legend which the teacher must attach to the icon”.  
A legend attached to a picture functions as an index pointing to the picture. 
The association that first needs to be made between the sound image and the 
symbolic legisign, the word of the French language, is thus an indexical one. In 
the long run, as the student’s language competence grows, the association first 
made indexically must become a habit, so that in the end the word first learned 
through an icon and an index finally becomes a symbol.  
 
 
4. Meaning, translation, and the interpretant of a sign 
Where do we find meaning in the process of translation? Is the translation 
delivered by an interpreter the meaning of its source text, and if so, is the 
translation then the interpretant of the text which it translates? Or should we 
look for the meaning of a sign in the object it represents? Meaning is both a 
matter of the object of the sign and of its interpretant. It is a matter of the former 
insofar as the object is “that with which the sign presupposes an acquaintance” 
(CP 2.231, 1910). The interpreter must be familiar with the object in order to 
associate meaning with the sign; otherwise the sign will remain meaningless. 
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Knowledge of the object of the sign is thus a prerequisite for understanding the 
sign. Peirce also associates the immediate object of a symbol, “the Object as the 
Sign itself represents it” (CP 4.536, 1905), with meaning. He does so when he 
calls “the complete immediate Object” of the symbol its “meaning” (CP 2.293, 
1903; see also CP 1.339, 1893 and 2.308, 1901). Mostly, however, Peirce 
considers meaning in terms of the interpretation of a sign. “Meaning is the idea 
which the sign attaches to the object” (CP 5.6, 1907). The study of meaning 
requires “the study of the interpretants, or proper significate effects, of signs” (CP 
5.475, 1906). More precisely, what is ordinarily called meaning is a matter of 
“the Immediate Interpretant, which is the interpretant as it is revealed in the right 
understanding of the Sign itself” (CP 4.536). Peirce explains, for example: “It 
seems natural to use the word meaning to denote the intended interpretant of a 
symbol” (CP 5.175, 1903). A translation should certainly convey a meaning that 
is equivalent to its source text. However, an actual translation and an actual 
interpretant created by a sign may fail to fulfill the task and create a meaning that 
does not correspond to the meaning of the sign with which they should be equi-
valent. This is why Peirce does not speak of actual interpretants and real trans-
lations but of the “intended interpretant of a symbol”. Notice that the meaning 
which he describes as the “intended interpretant” is not the expression of the 
intention of the utterer of this symbol but of the purpose of the symbol itself.  
That meanings and interpretants have to do with translation is one of the 
cornerstones of Peirce’s semiotics. In 1893, for example, Peirce postulates that 
“the meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated into” (CP 4.132), and 
he defines meaning as “the translation of a sign into another system of signs” 
(CP 4.127). It was Roman Jakobson (1985: 251) who enthusiastically ac-
claimed this definition of meaning as “one of the most felicitous, brilliant ideas 
which general linguistics and semiotics gained from the American thinker”, 
asking: “How many fruitless discussions about mentalism and anti-mentalism 
would be avoided if one approached the notion of meaning in terms of 
translation?” 
However, the Jakobsonian “translation theory of meaning”, as Short (2003; 
2007) calls it, is not Peirce’s full theory of meaning. Meaning, as linguists use 
the term and as Peirce himself uses it occasionally, is only expressed in the form 
of some interpretants of a sign.5 That an interpretant is not always the meaning 
                                                          
5  Short (2003: 223) even goes further and tries to solve the riddle of meaning by intro-
ducing a distinction between interpretations (as types of which interpretants are the tokens): 
“Thus, our gloss of the interpretant theory of meaning: rightly understood it does not mean 
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of a word is evident from our previous examples. The French word homme is 
one possible interpretant of its English equivalent, and it is true that in 
common parlance we can say that homme means man. However, as Short 
(2003: 218) has convincingly argued, in a strict sense, a word of a source 
language cannot properly be said to mean the word in the target language. The 
English word man can hardly be said to be the meaning of the French word 
homme although the former can help a learner of French to understand the 
latter. If all possible translations of the French word were to be considered its 
meanings, the word homme would have as many meanings as there are 
languages in the world in addition to those few meanings listed in a 
monolingual dictionary. We cannot say that the translation of a word or text 
into a target language is its meaning although it may serve as a tool to reveal its 
meaning. What we have to say more precisely is that the English word man and 
its semantic equivalent in French, homme, have the same meaning. Translators 
cannot discover the meaning of man in its French translation homme because 
they must know the meaning which both words have in common in order to 
find the equivalent word in the target language. Occasionally, translators can 
translate a word correctly without knowing their meaning. A translator versed 
in French phonetics and morphology may well be able to translate the English 
expression good governance correctly into French as bonne gouvernance without 
knowing what it means, but then translation is even less likely to reveal the 
enigmatic meaning of these two expressions which indeed mean the same, 
namely the ‘good way in which something is governed’. 
What is then the meaning of a word in contrast to its interpretant? Meaning 
is not a key concept in Peirce’s semiotics and has no systematic place in it. 
When Peirce refers to meaning he likes to use quotation marks (CP 5.475, 
1906) or speak of meaning as it “is ordinarily called” (CP 4.536, 1906). In 
Peirce’s semiotics, meaning is mainly a matter of the interpretant, but it also 
pertains to the object of a sign. In the case of a symbol, for example, it also 
pertains to its object since “the immediate object of a symbol can only be a 
symbol”, and “the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of 
the nature of a law” (CP 2.293 and fn., 1902). The example of the traffic light 
above, whose object is a law, exemplifies this insight.  
                                                                                                                                        
that meanings are interpretants but, rather, that they are interpretations, albeit interpretations 
are not found apart from interpretants. Doubtless, some interpretations are not meanings. For 
misunderstandings must be ruled out, and perhaps some other categories of interpretation as 
well. The meaning of a sign is how it would be interpreted properly.”  
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The meaning conveyed by the immediate object of a sign, that is, by our 
previous knowledge of the object of this sign, and the meaning conveyed as the 
interpretant of a sign are complementary. Without the immediate object, that 
is, without a rich experience of what the sign means in reality and not only in 
the form of a general dictionary definition, our interpretation of propositions 
would have to remain vague and general (cf. Houser 1992: 497). The 
interpretant of a sign, says Peirce, “must be conveyed” from its immediate object 
“which is by this conveyance the ultimate cause of the mental effect. […] The 
meaning of the sign is not conveyed until not merely the interpretant but also 
this object is recognized” (MS 318 41–42, alt. draft, 1907; Pape 1990: 382).  
On the other hand, Peirce excludes reference of indexical signs to the 
objects they designate from the sphere of meaning when he states: “A meaning 
is the associations of a word with images, its dream exciting power. An index 
has nothing to do with meanings; it has to bring the hearer to share the 
experience of the speaker by showing what he is talking about” (CP 4.56, 1893). 
Here we see a difference between meaning and translation. Even though 
indexical words, for example the demonstrative pronouns this and that mean 
nothing but only serve to direct our attention to an object close-by or further 
away, these words can and need to be translated. Verbal indices are 
unintelligible unless the mental images of the immediate objects which they 
represent are evoked to reveal what the signs mean. 
The notion of the interpretant also differs from the concept of meaning as 
linguists define it in its scope. In 1904, Peirce specifies: “We may take a sign in 
so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not [only] a thought, but an action 
or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its 
interpretant is a mere quality of feeling” (CP 8.332). The interpretant of a 
verbal sign can hence be a nonverbal sign, a gesture, a drawing, a painting, a 
piece of music, an action, or a feeling, or an artefact, but parallel with this broad 
concept of interpretant, Peirce’s broad concept of meaning is also apparent 
when he speaks about the “dream exciting power” of meanings (CP 4.56, 1893; 
see above). Translators-interpreters are not the only agents to convey the full 
intended meanings of their source texts. The words of their translations and the 
objects which these signs represent contribute to the creation of interpretants 
in their audience’s minds with an agency of their own, which is not the 
translator’s agency. 
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5. Translations as replicas of signs,  
semantic, and pragmatic meaning 
Some of Peirce’s remarks on meaning and translation must be understood as 
the expression of a logical perspective on meaning, which certainly differs from 
the translator’s perspective insofar as the logician, at least in propositional 
logic, abstracts from some of the modal distinctions which are of importance to 
a good translation. For example, Peirce writes: “What we call the meaning of a 
proposition embraces every obvious necessary deduction from it” (CP 5.165, 
1902). That which is deductible with logical necessity can obviously only be 
one kind of meaning since meaning is often vague and general.  
The logical perspective on meaning has Peirce conclude, for example, that 
not only interlingual but also intersemiotic translations leave the meaning of 
translated signs unchanged: “One selfsame thought may be carried upon the 
vehicle of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams, or in equations, or in 
graphs: all these are but so many skins of the onion, its inessential accidents” 
(CP 4.6, 1906). Since thoughts are signs, what Peirce means here is that 
logically, the different interlingual translations of one and the same text are 
replicas of one and the same symbol, an idea which he expresses explicitly 
elsewhere. He develops this argument several times in 1904: “If two symbols 
are used, without regard to any differences between them, they are replicas of 
the same symbol” (EP 2: 317). “(For logical purposes) a whole book is a sign, 
and a translation of it is a replica of the same sign” (NEM IV: 239), and: 
“Replicas need not be alike as things homo, man […] are the same signs” (MS 
9: 2, 1904; cf. Johansen 1993: 151).  
Logical equivalence is not only what translators strive for since they know 
that semantic equivalence is an ideal in interlingual translation that can never 
be fully achieved. Translators evidently need to pay attention to the subtlest 
distinctions even though these may be logically irrelevant. Among the semantic 
differences by which the tokens of one and the same symbol may differ and 
which Peirce thus considers as logically “insignificant” are “merely gram-
matical” differences, such as the one between the pronouns he and him, or 
“merely rhetorical differences” such as the one between money and spondesime, 
a slang word for money in Peirce’s time (NEM IV: 255, 1904). Peirce knew 
well that from the point of view of rhetoric such differences were highly 
significant. He always paid much attention to matters of terminology and style 
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and was a translator himself.6 In a footnote on semantic equivalence in 
language used in an informal dialogue, he gives a definition of semantic 
equivalence from the point of view of linguistic pragmatics: “Two signs whose 
meanings are for all purposes equivalent are absolutely equivalent” (CP 5.448, 
1905). By this definition, the formal and the slang words for money as well as 
the forms of the English personal pronouns in their different cases would 
certainly not count as equivalent because they differ in their purpose of use. 
Above, we concluded with Short (2003: 219) that a word of a target 
language and a word of a source language to which it is semantically equivalent 
are two signs expressing the same meaning. Evidently, the same also holds true 
for two words which are synonymous, paraphrases, or definitions of each other 
in one and the same language. To say that tidy means ‘neat’ or that thief means 
‘someone who steals’ is imprecise. A definiendum does not mean its definiens. 
Instead, both are different tokens of one type or, as Peirce puts it, merely 
“different embodiments of all we believe about that symbol” (MS 731, 7, 1865; 
Johansen 1993: 160). 
Like translations, synonyms, paraphrases and definitions serve to translate 
meanings without being meanings. Peirce gave several examples of how the 
meaning of a word can be translated by means of one of its verbal descriptions, 
for example, when he reminds his readers that the known characters of a dog 
include “it has four legs, is a carnivorous animal etc.” (MS 854: 2–3, 1911; 
Johansen 1993: 146) or when he describes the meaning of the word woman as 
‘living adult being or having, or having had, female sexuality’ (MS 664: 9, 1910; 
ibid.: 147). Let us call this translation approach to the study of meaning the 
semantic approach to meaning.  
However, in contrast to modern linguistic semantics that reduces meaning 
to the translation of complex words into simpler words (in the form of 
componential analysis) or referential meaning (in referential semantics), 
Peirce’s semantics always takes both modes of revealing meaning into 
consideration. He exemplifies the possibility of studying meanings by means of 
intralingual translation in his logical decompositions of words into their 
“characters” and holds the dimension of reference indispensible when he 
postulates the necessity of collateral knowledge. The two complementary 
                                                          
6  Despite his great interest in differences between languages (cf. Nöth 2002), and although 
he often worked as a translator himself, Peirce can certainly not be called a scholar in 
translation studies. For Peirce as a translator and a critic of translations (see MS 1514–1520), 
in particular from German, see Deledalle-Rhodes (1996) and Gorlée (1994: 115–18). 
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aspects of meaning are reflected in his distinction between verbal and 
informational knowledge. The study of meaning requires taking into 
consideration informational knowledge, which is experientially acquired and 
thus pertains to the dimension of the immediate object of the sign, as well as 
verbal meaning, which has the form of a translation into a paraphrase or of a 
verbalization of its “characters” (semantic features). The meaning of a word 
cannot be reduced to either of the two. These are the two sides of Peirce’s 
linguistic semantics.  
In addition to the semantic theory of meaning, to which this paper had to be 
restricted, Peirce has also a pragmatic theory of meaning, which is most 
succinctly expressed in his pragmatic maxim that the meaning of a sign lies in 
its conceivable practical effects.7 It was the comparison of the semantic and 
pragmatic approaches to meaning that finally led the pragmaticist Peirce to the 
conclusion that the pragmatic study of meaning is really superior to its 
semantic study. The reason is that verbal formulations merely express 
meanings and are therefore “very inferior to the living definition that grows up 
in the habit” (NEM III.1: 494, 1907; cf. 5.491). 
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Перевод и семиотическое посредничество 
По Чарльзу Пирсу перевод – это семиотическое посредничество. В знаковых про-
цессах знак действует как посредник между двумя участниками – объектом (который 
он репрезентирует) и интерпретантом (вызванной им идеи, созданной им интер-
претацией или обусловленным им действием). В какой мере действия переводчика как 
посредника можно рассматривать подобно действиям знака в ходе семиозиса? В 
статье рассматриваются параллели между действиями знака в семиозисе и действиями  
переводчика в процессе перевода. В статье утверждается, что некоторые границы и 
ограничения переводимости совпадают с границами знака в семиозисе. Так как 
настоящие иконы и индексы не передают значения, они, строго говоря, непере-
водимы. Несмотря на это, иконы и индексы являются посредниками при обучении 
переводу. 
Tõlkimine ja semiootiline vahendamine 
Charles S. Peirce’i järgi on tõlkimine semiootiline vahendamine. Märgiprotsessides üldiselt 
toimib märk vahendajana kahe osapoole vahel, milleks on objekt (mida ta representeerib) 
ja interpretant (tema poolt esile kutsutud idee või tema loodud interpretatsioon või tema 
põhjustatud tegevus). Mil määral vastab viis, kuidas toimib vahendajana tõlkija, sellele, 
mida teeb märk semioosis? Artikkel vaatleb lähemalt paralleele semioosis toimiva märgi 
agentsuse ja tõlgi (ning tõlkija) agentsuse vahel tõlkimises. Artikkel väidab, et mõned 
tõlgitavuse piirid ja piirangud on ühtlasi märgi piirid semioosis. Kuna tõelised ikoonid ja 
tõelised indeksid ei edasta tähendust, on nad rangelt võttes tõlkimatud. Sellegipoolest 
toimivad ikoonid ja indeksid vahendajatena tõlkima õppimisel. 
